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The debate if the point null hypothesis is ever literally true cannot be resolved, because
there are three competing statistical systems claiming ownership of the construct. The
local resolution depends on personal acclimatization to a Fisherian, Frequentist, or
Bayesian orientation (or an unexpected fourth champion if decision theory is allowed to
compete). Implications of Rao and Lovric’s proposed Hodges-Lehman paradigm are
discussed in the Appendix.
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In their historical reviews of experimental design, Cochran (1977) and Frank
Yates posited the first planned controlled experiment was conducted by Daniel
(7th–6th century BCE), who employed a ten day treatment vs comparison group
post-test only trial. The purpose was to demonstrate the efficacy of a Kosher diet
of high protein, low fat, dried legume seeds and water on soldiering skills vs
Nebuchadnezzar’s army’s royal comestible of non-Kosher wine and meat (Daniel
1:3-16). In Contra Celsus (1:15), Origen of Alexandria (153–253 CE) cited
Hermippus (5th century BCE) and Hecatæus (4 th century, BCE, presumably of
Abdera) who opined subsequent development of analytical analyses of
experimental principles by the Jews influenced, if not culminated in, Pythagoras’
philosophy of mathematical sciences. Subsequently, Tana Kama (Mishna Gittin
7:1; Talmud Gittin 67b) underscored the importance of co-variables and the
minimum number of repetitions for a reliable single subject study design. Shimon
ben Chalafta also invoked experimental replications to test claims (e.g., Talmud
Chulin 57b).
In the middle of the 2 nd century CE, Galen (Aelius/Claudius Galenus)
mused how much credence should be given, if any, to a 50th medical study if the
previous 49 replications were of no significance. In the early 11 th century CE,
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Avicenna (Abu ibn Sina) reacted to haphazard methods in the conduct and
analysis of experiments and presented seven governing rules. In 1266 CE, Roger
Bacon systematized observation of empirical data in controlled experiments.
Arthur Young (1771, Figure 1) published a course on experimental agriculture,
wherein comparative designs employing standardized methods and analyses were
proposed. The analysis of the hypothesis “every year there shall be born more
males than females” (1710-1712, p. 188) by John Arbuthnott (un-admittedly
inspired by Sir William Petty & John Graunt) is considered the origin of the
nonparametric Sign Test, although it predates more formal origins of empirical
probability captured in the treatises on the doctrines of conjecture and chance by
Jacob Bernoulli (1713), Abraham de Moivre (1718) and Thomas Bayes (Price,
1763, p. 370).
In the early part of the 20 th century CE, Sir Ronald Fisher (influenced by
Pierre-Simon Laplace, Carl Gauss, Joseph Jastrow, Sir Francis Galton, Karl
Pearson, G. Udny Yule, William Gosset, and certainly others; perhaps later also
with Andrey Kolmogorov & E. J. G. Pittman) defined the null hypothesis, the
fundamental building block of modern hypothesis testing, as being true unless
there is evidence from the sample (randomly obtained or data at hand) to the
contrary. His innovations regarding blocking variables and factorial layouts were
pioneering developments in the design of experiments.
Following the logic of experimentation by C. S. Peirce in late 19 th century,
the Frequentist lemma by Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson developed in the
1930s-1940s violated the Fisherian cannon with the introduction of the alternative
hypothesis. It was indeed irrefragable blasphemy, because Frequentists must
admit the choice and magnitude of the alternative are subjective and independent
of both the null hypothesis and the sample. Other 20 th century developments in
experimental design included orthogonal arrays by my esteemed colleague
Professor C. R. Rao, sequential experiments by Abraham Wald and later Herman
Chernoff, and the quality control designs of Genichi Taguchi.
Nevertheless, the Frequentists had the advantage, because in the Fisherian
system the lack of an alternative obviated the desired notion of fixed comparative
statistical power, and by extension, stable effect size. These two modern
approaches to statistics are antipodal. Many misunderstandings in hypothesis
testing are due to their intrinsic incompatibility, starting with Sir Fisher’s “lapsus
linguae” (Neyman, 1941, p. 129) fiducial argument (see Sawilowsky, 2003).
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Figure 1. Arthur Young (1801), Annals of Agriculture and other Useful Arts, Vol 37.
London: Rackham & Hill. (From the JMASM Archives.)
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This struggle provided the segue for a Bayesian resurrection from Fisher’s
epithet, “From a purely historical standpoint it is worth noting that the ideas and
nomenclature for which I am responsible were developed only after I had inured
myself to the absolute rejection of the postulate of Inverse Probability” (1937a, p.
151; see also 1937b, 1939). Although also receiving a boost from C. S. Peirce’s
logic, Bayesian analysis during Sir Fisher’s reign was conducted without benefit
of his development of degrees of freedom. The initial inability to replicate
Fisherian/Frequentist numerical results was a serious setback to the modern
Bayesian paradigm (Sawilowsky, 2002, 2003). Although they have since
recovered and inverse probability is currently quite popular, unless there are
documented informative prior probabilities available, such as baseball batting
averages, Fisher’s inurement prevails.
Now comes the debate on certifying the literal truth of the null hypothesis.
Original Fisherians needs no proof, because postulation of the putative null was
the pivotal theoretic spanning well over two millennia in the science of
discovering truth. Frequentists, however, can never accept any proof. The most
that can be said is based on the current sample there is no evidence to support the
alternative. (This should not be considered an open invitation to collecting
potentially endless (a) random samples, known as the quest for a Type I error and
its attendant rewards of publishing and tenure or (b) data sets at hand, known as
non-representative findings never interpreted with caution to support situational
truths with its attendant rewards of political fodder, ill-begotten relief from the
court, financial returns based on false advertising, etc.) Moreover, it wouldn’t
matter even if the null hypothesis is always literally false, because it must be false
to an a priori specified magnitude to be rejected.
The Frequentist nomenclature, failure to reject the null hypothesis, was just
the ticket in the social and behavioral sciences, where politically correct thinking
of the 1960s had begun to take control of those in charge of the keys to situational
truths. At best, near-null, near-nil, and the like, were approved substitutes.
Philosophically, the yellow submarine is a closed system, so at some decimal of
the mantissa there must be a non-Zero value.
The various Frequentist counterproofs were flawed attempts to make
something out of nothing by incorrectly preserving the post hoc effect size even
when the statistical test was not significant. For example, in the two sample layout,
the t statistic is a test of difference between two means. If the p value is above the
a priori selected nominal α level, it means the observed difference is not real and
should be read as zero. Based on the sample, assumed to be random for
generalization purposes, there is no evidence that the populations from which they
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were drawn differed in terms of location. Just as the observed difference in means
can be safely ignored, the effect size was not statistically significantly different
from zero, and can be safely ignored.
This means regardless of the magnitude of the obtained value (e.g., Cohen’s
d, 1962, 1969, 1977, 1988) in the two sample layout [from very small (0.01;
Sawilowksy, 2009) to small (0.2; Cohen, 1988) to moderate (0.5; Cohen, 1988) to
large (0.8; Cohen, 1988) to very large (1.2; Sawilowsky, 2009) to huge (2.0;
Sawilowsky, 2009)], it should be read and interpreted as zero. Hence, the point
null hypothesis, to the Fisherian, is indeed considered to be literally true
regardless of the magnitude of Cohen’s d when the p value is greater than nominal
α.
In the antecedent article, colleagues C. R. Rao and M. Lovric
(http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/jmasm/vol15/iss2/2), cited Cohen (1990) who
wrote the null hypothesis can only be true “in the bowels of a computer processor
running a Monte Carlo study (and even then a stray electron may make it false)”
(p. 1, 308). Based on my letters with him, documented elsewhere, Cohen’s
statement was not surprising.
Subsequently, this was discussed conceptually in Knapp and Sawilowsky
(2001, p. 71-74; for expanded commentary relative to the debate see Harlow, et
al., 1997; Imbens & Rubin, 2015). I included Meehl’s (1990) recapitulation that
he initially referred only to quasi-experiments and surveys (Meehl, 1978), but
later admitted the null hypothesis can be literally true in an “experimental study”
(Meehl, 1990, p. 204). (Carol H. Ammons, the co-Editor of Psychological
Reports where it was published, sent me a reprint of Meehl (1990) soon after its
publication. In our subsequent conversation, I was supportive of Meehl’s
recapitulation, and I remain so today.) Similarly, in Knapp and Sawilowksy
(2001) I also included Hagen’s (1997, p. 20) imputed recapitulation of Cohen
(1994).
A simple demonstration of the algorithm I presented in Knapp and
Sawilowsky (2001) is coded in R in Figure 2. When executed, it creates two
groups, x and y, and populates them with scores randomly selected from the
standard normal curve. Although a Monte Carlo is unnecessary when underlying
assumptions are met, it is employed to facilitate the demonstration. The two
independent samples pooled variance t test is conducted on the data, and if the p
value is less than nominal α = 0.05, a counter is incremented. The process is
repeated 100,000 times. The final value of the counter is divided by the number of
repetitions to produce the Type I error rate.
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The code will produce the same result on any computer platform and
operating system, because the seed number is set for the pseudo-random number
generator. That result is 0.04919. Rejections occurred across the 100,000
repetitions, but they were known false positives. The point null hypothesis was
indeed literally true, because it was programmed to be so. The collection of false
positives that give rise to the notion the point null is never literally true were
simply the constituent figments of imagination that sum to the Type I error rate.
set.seed (123457)
to5 <- NULL
rep <- 100000
rejt05 <- numeric(length=rep)
ss <- 30
for (i in 1:rep) {
x1 <- rnorm(ss)
x <- x1+0.0
y <- rnorm(ss)
tp <- t.test(x,y,var=TRUE)[["p.value"]]
rejt05[i] <- ifelse (tp < 0.05,1,0)
}
t05 <- sum(rejt05)/rep
Figure 2. Monte Carlo t Test in R Code

The rejection rate obtained from the code will approach 0.05 as (a) the
sample size, set to 30 per group in this example, increases, (b) the number of
repetitions of the experiment increases, or (c) possibly even with the current study
parameters if a different initial seed number is selected (Hill & Sawilowsky,
2011). For example, if the number of repetitions is increased to 1,000,000, the
Type I error improves to 0.049858.
A non-null condition can be created by replacing the 0.0 with a non-zero
number (positive or negative) in the line x <− x1 + 0.0. For example, to
model a very small effect size of 0.01 (Sawilowsky, 2009), replace the 0.0 in this
code segment with a constant c = 0.01 (representing 0.01*σ; where σ refers to the
standard deviation of the normal curve = 1). The constant c is added to each
member of the x group and shifts its location by that magnitude, while leaving the
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scale unaffected. The resulting rejection rate is known as statistical power (not
Type I error rate). With 100,000 repetitions it amounts to 0.04923, a nuanced but
detectable difference of 0.00004 above nominal α for this sample size and data
pseudo-randomly sampled from the standard normal curve.
If the effect size is increased to 0.05 the power yield increases to .05342,
and for an effect size of 0.1 the power increases to 0.06542. For Cohen’s (1988)
small effect size of 0.2, the power increases further to 0.11611. As the effect size
approaches infinity (and depending on the distribution and sample size, the effect
size may not need to increase past a small fraction or multiple of its σ) the power
approaches 1.
Random numbers represent a literally true null condition. This R code
proves that when the point null is literally true, the t test (if all conditions are met,
i.e., normality, homoscedasticity, independence) will retain the null hypothesis to
the nominal α level. Hence, in real world applications of a true randomized
experimental design, if there is no difference between x and y (the two sample
means) the t test will testify to that fact.
Execution of the R code demonstrates increasing the sample size and/or
number of repetitions of the experiment to ∞ will not lead to a rejection rate of the
null hypothesis different from nominal α, which is the answer to Cohen’s
speculation of what might happen in the bowels of a Monte Carlo study.
Moreover, despite the current fascination with big data (and hopefully its ardent
fans are able to recognize and deprecate its often hidden or embedded stepwise
methods), Gosset noted many in applied disciplines we are forced to work with
small samples. This was aptly captured in Sir Fisher’s revelation to Samuel
Stouffer regarding the inspiration for deriving a certain postulate: something had
to be done when rabbits got into the garden and ate a lot of the degrees of freedom.
To the Fisherian, QED. To the Frequentist, the discussion is much ado about
(something that can never be literally) nothing. To the Bayesian, add noninformative priors to the perils of non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and nonindependence; and then choose sides.
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Appendix
In Knapp and Sawilowsky (2001), I presented rebuttals to “the following
propositions:








The null hypothesis is always false.
A sufficiently large enough sample guarantees rejection of the null
hypothesis.
Statistical tests are of no use because the results do not address
practical importance.
Testing a near-nil null hypothesis is better than testing a null
hypothesis.
Hypothesis testing does not lead to scientific discoveries.
Confidence intervals are superior to hypothesis testing.
Effect sizes should be reported regardless of the outcome of
hypothesis testing.” (p. 71).

The subjectivity of defining a near-nil null hypothesis will also have a deleterious
effect on equivalence testing, and could be added to the above list.
With regard to testing a near-nil null instead of a null hypothesis, Rao and
Lovric, in the antecedent article, proposed a paradigm shift to testing the
negligible null hypothesis:
H0 :|θ – θ0 | ≤ δ (Effect size is negligible) against
H1 :|θ – θ0 | > δ (Effect size is practically meaningful).
They aptly named it the “Hodges-Lehmann paradigm,” a nomenclature well
known in other contexts. In R-measures of location, for example, the inversion of
signed ranks can lead to the Hodges-Lehmann estimator, a robust (median
unbiased) pseudo-θ point estimator of symmetry (Hodges & Lehmann, 1963). In
bracketed (see Sawilowsky, 2003, p. 128) intervals, the Hodge-Lehmann
treatment alternative is modeled by a systematic progression from pseudo-θ,
although no expertise is called on to determine negligible or practical
meaningfulness.
Regarding near-nill null hypotheses within the context of hypothesis testing,
I’ve opined (Knapp & Sawilowsky, 2001),
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This remedy's attendant difficulties are obvious considering the
chaos that would arise from the infinite number of near-nils that might
be chosen. (Eventually, we speculate, some common near-nils would
emerge and evolve into a universally accepted traditional near-nil,
completing the circle.) Moreover, the near-nil weakens the Fisherian
logic regarding the null hypothesis, which is indirect proof by
contradiction. If the probability associated with sample data obtained
from a designed study is so remote, the null hypothesis or the model
that generated it is contradicted. Rejecting a null hypothesis should be
more compelling than rejecting an arbitrarily chosen near-nil
hypothesis. Also, in the social and behavioral sciences for cases in
which treatment effects or naturally occurring differences are often
tiny, using the near-nil hypothesis when investigating interventions
with potentially subtle differences may hide a treatment effect.
Similarly, as the magnitude of the near-nil increases, the sample size
necessary to detect a false near-nil null hypothesis increases in the
treatment versus control group and related designs, which would be
highly undesirable. (p. 73).
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